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HOW REASONABLE IS “REASONABLE”?  
THE SEARCH FOR A SATISFACTORY 
APPROACH TO EMPLOYMENT HANDBOOKS 
BRYCE YODER† 
ABSTRACT 
  Although courts, in considering the enforceability of employment 
handbooks, have relied on a single source of principles, contract law, 
their inconsistent approaches have produced inequitable and 
irreconcilable results. This Note argues that courts should abandon 
their dependence on contract law when analyzing handbook claims 
and instead adopt an employment-based approach that balances the 
needs of employers with the realistic expectations of employees. 
Accordingly, this Note proposes three rules for analyzing the 
legitimacy of handbook modifications: (1) employers should always 
be permitted to unilaterally modify handbooks; (2) employers must 
provide employees reasonable notice, defined as a length of time set 
by the type and importance of the promise made in a handbook, 
before modifying a handbook; and (3) handbook disclaimers should 
be ignored, as they often have inequitable results for employees and 
employers alike. 
INTRODUCTION 
Employment at will is the default rule in American employment,1 
permitting either the employer or employee to terminate their 
relationship at any time for “good reason, bad reason, or no reason at 
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all.”2 Yet courts have increasingly chipped away at the presumption of 
at-will employment, in particular due to its often harsh and unfair 
impact upon employees.3 A notable example of this trend is the so-
called “handbook exception” to the at-will doctrine, under which 
employers who issue handbooks to their employees may create 
enforceable, implied contracts that negate the presumption of at-will 
employment.4 Quite commonly, employers provide their workforce 
such manuals—detailing the policies and procedures of the company, 
which may include everything from dismissal procedures to 
compensation rates—but no written contract. In the absence of an 
express agreement, employees are sometimes left without a remedy 
when a dispute over the work relationship arises. In such situations, 
the handbook is often the primary, or only, source of contractual 
terms.5 Recognizing the possibility that handbooks can impose 
binding obligations upon the employer—for implicit or explicit 
promises made in the handbook—thus helps ensure a degree of 
fundamental fairness in the relationship between employer and 
employees.6 
But the evolution of handbook jurisprudence has generated 
much disagreement. Not only do courts differ widely in the effect they 
 
 2. Bellum v. PCE Constructors, Inc., 407 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Payne v. 
W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519–20 (1884) (“All [employers] may dismiss their employees 
at will . . . for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby 
guilty of legal wrong.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Fulford v. Burndy Corp., 623 F. Supp. 78, 80 (D.N.H. 1985) (holding that “a 
termination by the employer of a contract of employment at will which is motivated by bad faith 
or malice or based on retaliation is not in the best interest of the economic system or the public 
good”); Frampton v. Cent. Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ind. 1973) (holding that “when an 
employee is discharged solely for exercising a statutorily conferred right an exception” to the at-
will employment rule operates); see also Richard J. Pratt, Comment, Unilateral Modification of 
Employment Handbooks: Further Encroachment on the Employment-at-Will Doctrine, 139 U. 
PA. L. REV. 197, 201–02 (1990) (describing challenges to the rationale for the at-will 
employment rule). 
 4. Jason A. Walters, Comment, The Brooklyn Bridge Is Falling Down: Unilateral Contract 
Modification and the Sole Requirement of the Offeree’s Assent, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 375, 375, 378–
79 (2002). Other prominent exceptions to at-will employment include tort claims based on 
public policy and an implied duty of good faith. Id. at 378. 
 5. See, e.g., Brown v. Sabre, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 581, 588–89 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (holding 
that an employee to whom promises of vacation time had only been made in a manual with a 
disclaimer was not entitled to relief as there had been no breach of contract). 
 6. See Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1271 (N.J. 1985), modified, 
499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985) (“All that . . . [is] require[d] of an employer is that it be fair. It would 
be unfair to allow an employer to distribute a policy manual that makes the workforce believe 
that certain promises have been made and then to allow the employer to renege on those 
promises.”). 
06__YODER.DOC 5/27/2008 1:57:58 PM 
2008] HOW REASONABLE IS “REASONABLE”? 1519 
grant employment handbooks—some still do not recognize them as 
legally binding upon the employer at all7—they vary greatly in the 
legal framework within which they analyze the issue.8 For example, 
many courts rely exclusively on what they regard as traditional 
contract law, whereas others base their results on public policy.9 The 
result is a hodgepodge of various results and analytical methods: 
often courts achieve the “right” result for doctrinally questionable 
reasons,10 even though others achieve decidedly unfair or impractical 
results for technically correct reasons.11 
To comprehend the enormity of the confusion for courts, 
employers, and employees, consider the following example: “Tim” is 
an at-will employee with no written contract. He received a handbook 
in his first week on the job, in which all employees were guaranteed a 
minimum of three weeks of paid vacation per year, albeit by means of 
a fairly elaborate compensation scheme tied to seniority rights. This 
system had long been company policy and was one of the main 
reasons Tim took the job. The handbook, however, contained a 
disclaimer near its end, stating that nothing in the handbook 
regarding compensation should be considered an offer. Six months 
later, Tim’s employer provides a modified handbook stating that 
employees will no longer receive any paid vacation, although vacation 
time presently accrued may still be used. After Tim’s employer does 
 
 7. See Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661, 662 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) 
(holding that the “unilateral act of publishing its handbook was not a contractual offer to its 
employees”). 
 8. Most courts claim to apply traditional contracts principles; however, their specific 
applications of contract law and the attendant results are not uniform. For a full discussion, see 
infra Part I.B.2. 
 9. W. David Slawson, Unilateral Contracts of Employment: Does Contract Law Conflict 
with Public Policy?, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 9, 11 (2003). 
 10. Some courts permit unilateral modification of handbooks by an employer, but only if 
reasonable notice is provided to the employee, although requiring such notice conflicts with 
fundamental contracts principles. See, e.g., Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 999 P.2d 71, 73–74, 81 (Cal. 2000) 
(finding that two years after a unilateral modification was sufficient reasonable notice). For 
further discussion of the problems posed by this approach to unilateral modification of 
handbooks, see the discussion infra Part I.B.3.b. 
 11. Courts strictly applying traditional contract principles often allow employers to 
unilaterally modify handbooks which had previously created contractual agreements, sometimes 
without even providing reasonable notice. See, e.g., Progress Printing Co. v. Nichols, 421 S.E.2d 
428, 429, 431 (Va. 1992) (holding that although an employee had originally received a handbook 
containing a just cause promise, he reverted to being an at-will employee when he signed a form 
stating he was at will and he gave consideration by continuing to work for the employer). 
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not pay him for his next vacation, he sues for the amount he would 
have received under the terms of the original handbook. 
Courts approach problems such as this in one of several different 
ways. First, absent a clear intention from the employer to form a 
contractual relationship, the handbook could never have created an 
offer in the first place, and so Tim has no recourse.12 Second, the 
handbook could have potentially created an offer, but the disclaimer 
effectively prevented it from doing so, and Tim has no recourse.13 
Third, the disclaimer could be ignored—because of ambiguities in the 
disclaimer such as whether paid vacation is really compensation-
related and because of the long-standing practice of the employer—
and the employer must provide Tim with additional consideration to 
change the handbook.14 Thus, Tim is entitled to three weeks’ paid 
vacation for as long as he works there. Fourth, the handbook did 
create a valid offer, but the employer may modify it at any time 
without additional consideration, and Tim has no recourse.15 Fifth, the 
handbook did create a valid offer and the employer could modify by 
providing “reasonable notice”; Tim has recourse only if the 
notification was not reasonable.16 
Although the potential outcomes in this example are mostly 
uniform—Tim would most likely lose in four of the five instances—
the analyses behind the results vary significantly. As a result, slight 
changes to the fact pattern could have enormous consequences. For 
example, if the original handbook had no disclaimer but the 
subsequently modified handbook did, some courts would grant Tim a 
contractual right in that first handbook’s terms and require the 
 
 12. See, e.g., Johnson, 745 S.W.2d at 662 (holding that a reasonable employee would not 
interpret general language and a disclaimer in an employment handbook as an offer to modify 
an at-will employment agreement). 
 13. See, e.g., Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 540 N.W.2d 277, 287–89 (Iowa 1995) 
(holding that an “explicit disclaimer[]” in an employee manual barred the formation of a valid 
offer to modify at-will employment status). 
 14. See, e.g., Dillon v. Champion Jogbra, Inc., 819 A.2d 703, 708–09, 13 (Vt. 2002) (holding 
that a disclaimer that preceded a description of the employer’s termination policies was too 
ambiguous to create a clear at-will employment agreement). 
 15. See, e.g., Grovier v. N. Sound Bank, 957 P.2d 811, 815 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) 
(characterizing an employee handbook as “a unilateral contract . . . in which the promisor does 
not receive a promise in return as consideration”). 
 16. See, e.g., Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 999 P.2d 71, 78 (Cal. 2000) (“The general rule governing 
the proper termination of unilateral contracts [created by employee handbooks] is that once the 
promisor determines after a reasonable time that it will terminate or modify the contract, and 
provides employees with reasonable notice of the change, additional consideration is not 
required.”). 
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employer to provide consideration to modify.17 On the same facts, 
other courts would hold that unless a handbook represents a clear 
contractual offer, it cannot create binding obligations upon the 
employer, and so Tim has no remedy.18 Consequently, the underlying 
method with which a court approaches handbook jurisprudence 
makes a phenomenal difference, and courts are far from finding any 
uniform methodology. 
The differing, and often contradictory, ways in which courts 
confront handbooks arise from a pervasive and fundamental 
mischaracterization of the employment relationship: the connection 
between employer and employee has wrongly been treated as one of 
contract rather than status.19 Even when they entirely disagree on the 
outcome in handbook cases, nearly all courts analyze the situation as 
a contractual dispute.20 But by rigorously applying contract law to 
employment cases when the fit is at best awkward and at worst 
misguided, the result is an unhappy marriage in which the 
employment relationship is harmed by inequitable results while 
contract law is warped into an undesirable shape.21 Consequently, a 
strict contract-based analysis of the validity and interpretation of 
employment handbooks should be abandoned in favor of a common-
sense approach that acknowledges the employment relationship as 
one of status. 
In response to the dilemma, which is perpetuated by a 
mischaracterization of employment as a contractual relationship, this 
Note proposes three foundational rules for analyzing handbooks: 
1. Employers should always be allowed to modify their 
handbooks upon reasonable notice without any further 
burden, such as providing “additional consideration.” 
 
 17. See, e.g., Demasse v. ITT Corp., 984 P.2d 1138, 1144 (Ariz. 1999) (holding that “an 
implied-in-fact employment term must be governed by . . . traditional contract law” including 
offer, acceptance, and consideration). 
 18. See, e.g., Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661, 662 (Mo. 1988) (en 
banc) (opining that “[a]n employer’s offer must be stated with greater definiteness and clarity” 
than in the employee handbook at issue). 
 19. For a thorough discussion of employment as a status rather than contractual 
relationship, see Franklin G. Snyder, The Pernicious Effect of Employment Relationships on the 
Law of Contracts, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 33, 42–47 (2003). 
 20. Walters, supra note 4, at 379. Several jurisdictions rely on public policy to find 
handbook promises binding. Id. 
 21. Snyder, supra note 19, at 35–36. 
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2. The length of advance notice required for modification to 
be “reasonable” should depend upon the nature of the 
promise being amended. 
3. Disclaimers should be irrelevant in determining whether a 
handbook, or its subsequent modification, is enforceable. 
Part I of this Note outlines the doctrinal confusion courts have 
created by treating the employment relationship as one of contract 
rather than status. Part II further explains the three proposed rules. 
Finally, Part III illuminates these rules by providing several examples 
of how they would alleviate doctrinal confusion and thus aid both 
employers and employees. 
I.  CONFLICTING APPROACHES TO HANDBOOK ANALYSIS 
A. Inconsistent Approaches by Courts Using Contract Law 
Although many courts have considered the topic, handbook 
jurisprudence has developed only since the 1970s22 and results are far 
from consistent. As a threshold matter, courts do not agree on the 
basic point of whether manuals can ever provide an exception to the 
at-will arrangement.23 The range spans from courts essentially holding 
that it is never possible to create contractual obligations through a 
manual,24 to those holding that manuals can give rise even to property 
interests.25 Nevertheless, almost all courts find that handbooks can—
under various circumstances—create contractual obligations upon the 
employer that obviate the at-will default.26 These courts, however, 
continue to disagree over the legal analysis that should govern 
handbook cases. 
 
 22. Brian T. Kohn, Contracts of Convenience: Preventing Employers from Unilaterally 
Modifying Promises Made in Employee Handbooks, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 810 n.66 (2003). 
 23. Compare Johnson v. Nat’l Beef Packing Co., 551 P.2d 779, 782 (Kan. 1976) (“[A 
handbook is] only a unilateral expression of company policy and procedures. Its terms were not 
bargained for by the parties and any benefits conferred by it were mere gratuities. Certainly, no 
meeting of the minds was evidenced by the [employer’s] unilateral act of publishing company 
policy.”), with Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1265–66 (N.J. 1985), 
modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985) (finding a handbook enforceable in accordance with the 
reasonable expectations it gave the employees). 
 24. Johnson, 745 S.W.2d at 661–62 (finding that a handbook was “merely an informational 
statement of . . . self-imposed policies”). 
 25. Thomas v. Ward, 529 F.2d 916, 919 (4th Cir. 1975). 
 26. Walters, supra note 4, at 379. 
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The vast majority of courts finding that handbooks can create 
binding obligations on an employer do so under a theory of unilateral 
contracts.27 The basic analysis is this: by issuing an employment 
manual, the employer creates an offer that the employee accepts and 
provides consideration for by continuing to work.28 But recognizing 
that handbooks can give rise to contractual obligations presents an 
even more challenging problem: specifically, in what manner may 
employers, having thus created additional employee rights, later limit 
or rescind those rights by amending or replacing the handbook? 
Despite claiming to apply the same jurisprudential approach 
(unilateral contracts), courts have reached fundamentally opposite 
results that generally fall into one of two schools: those that require 
additional consideration from the employer before the manual may 
be modified and those that do not.29 Although courts on both sides 
claim that their approach is ultimately rooted in contract law,30 the 
two approaches produce very different results. 
Both approaches are appealing for various reasons but in some 
instances result in gross inequity or impracticality.31 Permitting 
employers to unilaterally modify their handbooks allows them to 
discard important promises, such as job security, with little or no 
notice to their employees.32 In contrast, employers who must provide 
additional consideration before they can modify a handbook may be 
saddled in perpetuity with outmoded policies that they cannot 
effectively change, perhaps because some employees hold out or the 
cost to placate all employees is too high.33 
 
 27. Id. at 382. A handbook exception has also been recognized for public policy reasons in 
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich. 1980). 
 28. Slawson, supra note 9, at 21. Some courts, in contrast, use a bilateral contracts analysis, 
requiring that employers receive the employee’s consent to modify; this approach is incorrect, 
however, as an employer who issues a handbook does not exchange promises (the hallmark of a 
bilateral exchange) with the employee, but rather awaits the employee’s return promise, i.e., 
continuing to work. See Walters, supra note 4, at 384–85 (discussing various approaches by 
courts to modifications of employment contracts). 
 29. Walters, supra note 4, at 375–76. 
 30. Kohn, supra note 22, at 840 (“Neither the courts in favor of or against unilateral 
modification of implied employment contracts provide any justification firmly rooted in contract 
law for their positions. Nevertheless, a majority of the courts on both sides of the issue claim 
their decisions are grounded in traditional principles of contract law.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 31. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 32. See, e.g., Grovier v. N. Sound Bank, 957 P.2d 811, 813–17 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). For a 
complete discussion of the facts of this case, see supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text. 
 33. See, e.g., Doyle v. Holy Cross Hosp., 708 N.E.2d 1140, 1142–45 (Ill. 1999). In that case, 
several nurses terminated in 1991 sued a hospital to enforce termination procedures originally 
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The result is great confusion among employers and employees, 
who have no firm sense of what rights may or may not exist due to 
company manuals, and among the courts, which have no uniform 
answer to give. These disparate and unsatisfactory outcomes result 
from the doctrinally incorrect and normatively troubling application 
of contract law in the employment context. Specifically, the confusion 
that characterizes handbook jurisprudence emanates from courts who 
overzealously apply contract principles—such as “consideration,” 
“meeting of the minds,” and “offer and acceptance”—when 
determining the legal weight of an employment manual. 
B. The Undesirable Application of Contract Law in the Employment 
Context 
Employment law and contract law are in many ways strange 
bedfellows. Although a basic tenet of modern employment law is that 
the employment relationship is at heart a contractual one,34 
employment was not historically regarded as such,35 and contract law 
was not regarded as the proper tool for upholding the employment 
relationship. Problems that arise in the context of employment law 
often stem from the misguided application of contracts to the 
workplace.36 Changing how courts fundamentally view the 
employment relationship would be a positive step in achieving 
doctrinally consistent and just results. Perhaps they have just seen 
employment and contract lying side-by-side for so long that they have 
grown accustomed to the oddity. 
Applying contract law to employment cases in general is 
undesirable for four reasons: (1) it is inconsistent with the historical 
separation of contract and employment law; (2) it is theoretically 
misguided as contract and employment law attempt to accomplish far 
 
disseminated in a handbook issued in 1971. Id. at 1142–43. The court found that subsequent 
modifications to the handbook changing those policies were unenforceable because they lacked 
additional consideration, and so the hospital was obliged to follow the original terms. Id. at 
1145. For companies as large as a hospital, it may be practically impossible to ever modify 
handbooks because recognizing each employee’s date of hiring and acceptance of the 
handbook’s new terms will be necessary for the employer to enforce the modification. 
 34. Rachel Arnow-Richman, The Role of Contract in the Modern Employment 
Relationship, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 1, 1 (2003). 
 35. See Snyder, supra note 19, at 36–39 (explaining the historical origins of employment 
law). 
 36. See id. at 35 (detailing how “contract law frequently does a poor job of dealing with 
employment law issues”). 
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different goals; (3) it is normatively inappropriate to unite the two, as 
evidenced by the undesirable outcomes seen by various courts’ 
treatments of handbook cases; and (4) it encourages courts to employ 
handbook disclaimers dispositively, often in a particularly unfair 
manner. 
1. Historical Separation of Contract and Employment Law. 
Contract law and employment relationships grew from distinct and 
separate geneses. Contracts originated to protect commercial actors 
(buyers and sellers) in voluntary transactions for the purpose of 
encouraging and making more efficient commercial exchanges.37 On 
the other hand, employment law emerged from the necessity of 
regulating the relationship between master and servant.38 Thus, the 
employment relationship was, at its origin, one of status and not 
contract.39 This status-based approach to the work relationship—in 
which the servant labored for the master, who in turn looked out for 
the servant’s health and well-being40—was gradually subsumed by the 
view that employment was in fact a contractual arrangement,41 one 
that was best served by an absolute freedom for both parties to do as 
they pleased. The transition was consummated by the widespread 
adoption of the at-will rule in the mid-nineteenth century.42 Yet 
although the at-will rule fostered the growth of American industry in 
its infancy,43 a major lingering effect has been the harm of workers 
coping with a labor market that no longer exists in the paradigm of 
full-time, long-term, and stable employment.44 Accordingly, courts 
 
 37. Id. at 39. 
 38. Id. at 36–39. 
 39. Id. at 36. In analyzing the nature of the employment relationship, Professor Snyder is 
making a descriptive and not a normative argument: “I am not arguing that [employment] 
should be a status relationship, merely that it has been one since time immemorial and 
continues to be treated so today, regardless of the legal theories applied.” Id. at 34. 
 40. Pratt, supra note 3, at 198. 
 41. Snyder, supra note 19, at 43–44. 
 42. CRAIN, KIM & SELMI, supra note 1, at 9. 
 43. Pratt, supra note 3, at 200. 
 44. CRAIN, KIM & SELMI, supra note 1, at 51. Increasingly, employers have dismantled the 
traditional market model (viewing employment as lifelong or long-term) in favor of one 
regarding employment as short-term, in which highly mobile and autonomous workers change 
jobs fairly often (the median job tenure is only four years for workers at least sixteen years old). 
Id. at 67. Consequently, workers are more susceptible to downsizing, lay-offs, and other 
corporate realignments. Id. Additionally, the workplace has witnessed the decline of the 
seniority principle, which determines entitlement to fringe benefits by the worker’s seniority. 
Such systems have traditionally protected workers with the most invested in the company—and 
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have more frequently found exceptions to and ways around the unjust 
consequences of the at-will rule. 
2. Theoretical Difficulties in Applying Traditional Contract 
Principles to Employment.  Although the merging of employment law 
with contract law may have proved beneficial to industry, it was by no 
means a perfect, or even appropriate, match. Using contracts to deal 
with employment issues often makes for a poor fit—as one 
commentator has summed it up, in applying contract law to the 
employment relationship, “We are trying . . . to fill a round hole with 
a square peg.”45 On a fundamental level, employment law and 
contract law attempt to accomplish different goals, and forcefully 
merging the two can produce muddled and unjust results while having 
deleterious effects on both. Unsurprisingly, courts and commentators 
therefore struggle to apply traditional contract law to handbook 
cases. 
The most glaring disagreement is over how employers, having 
issued a handbook, may subsequently modify or rescind any promises 
contained therein. Those courts that conclude handbooks create 
binding contractual promises on the employer that cannot be 
modified without providing additional consideration to the employee 
base their analysis primarily on the notions of offer and acceptance.46 
They argue that although an employer can regard silence as 
acceptance of the initial issuance of a handbook—because rights are 
only being created—an employee’s continuing to work after the 
modified handbook was issued does not constitute acceptance of the 
offer contained in the amended handbook, and the modification is 
not binding.47 Instead, the employee must “necessarily demonstrate[] 
his consent to the proposed modification of the preexisting 
 
presumably with the lowest mobility—from unfair or harsh treatment. Id. at 72. Its collapse 
leaves workers, especially long-term workers, in a much more vulnerable position. Id.  
 45. Snyder, supra note 19, at 36. 
 46. See, e.g., Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., 662 A.2d 89, 99 (Conn. 1995) 
(holding that an employee does not accept the terms offered in a modified handbook merely by 
continuing to work); Pratt, supra note 3, at 221 (discussion the analytical steps under this 
method).  
 47. See, e.g., Thompson v. Kings Entm’t Co., 674 F. Supp. 1194, 1199 (E.D. Va. 1987) (“As 
with all offers, an offer embodied in an employee policy handbook may be accepted or rejected 
by the offeree-employee. . . . Requiring an offeree to take affirmative steps to reject an offer, 
however, is inconsistent with general contract law.”). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 69 cmt. a (1979) (discussing the inability of an offeror “to cause the silence of the 
offeree to operate as acceptance”). 
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contract.”48 The underlying premise behind this position is that in its 
absence employees would simply have no way to enforce the rights 
they gained from the manual in the first place.49 Yet a majority of 
courts permit unilateral modification of handbooks by an employer; 
these courts find that the employer’s modification represents an offer 
that the employee accepts by continuing to work.50 The practical 
difference in these approaches is that a requirement of additional 
consideration presumptively favors the employee challenging the new 
handbook, whereas unilateral modification strongly favors employers 
wanting to enforce the changed terms. Nevertheless, both sides claim 
that traditional contract principles favor their position.51 
This general confusion stems from a basic, theoretical error made 
by the courts: employment and contract law serve different doctrinal 
purposes, and so applying contract law in employment situations is 
fundamentally inappropriate. Although the employment relationship 
resembles a contract in that two independent actors are in essence 
agreeing to exchange labor for compensation,52 this simple paradigm 
is far from representing the many nuances of the employment 
relationship.53 For instance, many at-will employees do not have a 
written contract; rather, they make an oral or implied agreement to 
work for their employer.54 Typically, employment agreements are 
deliberately left incomplete to provide each party with the flexibility 
it desires in approaching the work relationship, and, more so than 
other contractual bargains, the employment relationship depends 
upon implied terms.55 Because of this extraordinarily open-ended 
arrangement, it appears that the “agreement” between employer and 
employee is not a contract at all but rather a mutual decision to enter 
into a master-servant arrangement in which both parties implicitly 
 
 48. Torosyan, 662 A.2d at 98.  
 49. See, e.g., id. at 99 (noting that if additional consideration is not required when 
employees are presented with a new manual, “[t]he employee’s only choices would be to resign 
or to continue working, either of which would result in the loss of the very right at issue”). 
 50. Slawson, supra note 9, at 11. 
 51. Kohn, supra note 22, at 840. 
 52. Snyder, supra note 19, at 33. 
 53. Arnow-Richman, supra note 34, at 1. 
 54. Clyde Summers, Contingent Employment in the United States, 18 COMP. LAB. L.J. 503, 
504 (1997); Donna Young, Racial Releases, Involuntary Separators, and Employment At-Will, 34 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 351, 357 (2001). 
 55. Katherine M. Apps, Good Faith Performance in Employment Contracts: A 
“Comparative Conversation” Between the U.S. and England, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 883, 
887–88 (2006). 
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recognize the flexibility needed by the other but rely upon the other 
to act appropriately for their mutual benefit.56 Accordingly, 
employment law, more so than contract law, attempts to do what is 
right by the parties rather than strictly enforce the terms of the 
bargain.57 
In contrast to the goal of regulating and protecting the parties 
engaged in a status relationship, contract law is premised on enforcing 
the agreements of parties without regard to their particular status or 
circumstances.58 Although generally employment law wants to protect 
and accommodate a reasonable working arrangement among the 
parties,59 contract law is willing to uphold the fringe or idiosyncratic 
preferences of individual actors.60 Even though the two areas of law 
overlap to a great degree, they do have underlying differences in 
goals and justification, which make their application in the other’s 
field oftentimes uncomfortable. Ultimately, continually applying 
contract law to employment situations harms the doctrines and 
principles behind both sets of law. 
Contract law is often bent into bizarre shapes when forced to 
tend to employment issues; for example, the sticky concept of 
promissory restitution evolved from an attempt to “do the right 
thing” in an employment case when no valid contractual remedy 
existed.61 In Webb v. McGowin,62 an employee saved his employer 
 
 56. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 34, at 2 (“Employees anticipate that their work 
obligations will develop and change over time, and they know they must oblige instructions and 
assignments that may exceed the bounds of any static job description. In return, they expect 
employers to abide by the letter and spirit of their official and unofficial promises, exercising 
managerial discretion equitably and making exceptions to the company policy where 
appropriate.” (footnote omitted)). 
 57. See Snyder, supra note 19, at 48 (“Our status notions with respect to employment are so 
strong that they tend to give us a powerful message as to what the ‘right’ result ought to be in a 
given case, regardless of the specific agreement of the parties.”). 
 58. Id. at 41. 
 59. See Pratt, supra note 3, at 216 (“Concerns of fairness and an increasing willingness to 
examine the employment relationship with approaches ‘more adopted [sic] to the realities of the 
workplace’ . . . . is part of a . . . . continuing erosion of the American Rule that increasingly takes 
into account the rights of employees and the public.” (footnotes omitted) (italics added)). 
 60. See RLS Assocs. v. United Bank of Kuwait, 380 F.3d 704, 709 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting 
that so long as an exchange has occurred, most agreements will be upheld because “[c]ourts do 
not inquire into the value or adequacy of the consideration,” which “may be minimal—even a 
peppercorn”). 
 61. See Snyder, supra note 19, at 49–52 (explaining how the contract doctrine of promissory 
restitution arose out of the situation in Webb v. McGowin, 168 So. 196 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935)). 
 62. Webb, 168 So. at 196. 
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from life-threatening injury and in doing so permanently injured 
himself.63 The employer responded by agreeing to pay him a pension 
for the rest of his life.64 After the employer’s death, however, his 
estate refused to continue payment to the employee.65 Because there 
were no workers’ compensation statutes at the time, the employee 
was without a remedy.66 To provide one, the court fashioned a 
contractual solution even though there was no mutual consideration 
in the classic contracts sense. That solution was its holding that the 
employer’s moral obligation to pay, combined with the material 
benefit of the employee’s saving his life, created a contractual 
obligation.67 Because the holding in Webb has subsequently been 
applied outside the employment context, contract law encompasses 
this expanded and much less precise definition of consideration and 
thus makes the application of contract law in general less clear.68 
Although contract and employment theories significantly 
overlap, it is preferable that judges divorce the two rather than 
continue this charade.69 Courts should be willing to formulate rules 
governing the employment relationship without relying on a 
contractual theory to support them. For handbooks analysis, this 
means moving away from contractual approaches; for example, it 
means ignoring handbook disclaimers entirely, even if in contract law 
courts ordinarily abide by all the terms an agreement contains.70 
3. Normative Problems with a Contractual Approach to 
Employment.  Relying exclusively on either of the two predominant 
approaches—requiring additional consideration or allowing unilateral 
modification by the employer—creates substantial normative 
problems. For instance, insisting that employers provide additional 
consideration before modifying their handbooks would likely 
discourage employers from issuing handbooks at all—even when their 
procedures would clarify employees’ rights—as businesses would be 
 
 63. Id. at 196–97. 
 64. Id. at 197. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Snyder, supra note 19, at 50. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 52. 
 69. See id. at 34 (“[C]ontract law seems to be applied differently in employment cases than 
in cases involving commercial transactions.”). 
 70. For a complete discussion of why disclaimers should be ignored entirely, see infra Part 
II.B.3. 
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trapped into rigid, inflexible business practices. On the other hand, 
permitting unilateral modification by an employer allows business 
owners to make all sorts of grand promises that have no binding 
effect, enticing employees to start or continue working only to have 
those promises whisked away at the employer’s whim. 
a. Additional Consideration Required for Modification.  Those 
who support requiring additional consideration point out that 
employees rely on handbooks and that employers expect them to do 
so; thus, it is counterintuitive to think that employers would be 
“harmed” by forcing them to abide by the policies they purposely 
promulgated in the first place.71 For instance, in Toroysan v. 
Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals72 the plaintiff employee agreed 
to work for the employer in part because of the manual’s promise that 
he could only be fired for cause.73 Consequently, the court held that 
the manual created rights for the employee, rights which could not be 
subsequently reduced without providing the employee additional 
consideration.74 Moreover, if employers derive some benefit from 
issuing handbooks, they should not be able to avoid the costs incident 
to that benefit; they owe the employees something upon changing 
those procedures that provided the employer with some benefit from 
the employees. 
Yet it makes little sense practically to require employers, who 
decide of their own accord to issue a statement of the company’s 
policies to then provide consideration to later modify that policy. 
Employers have no obligation or duty to issue a handbook in the first 
place, so having done so, they should be allowed to modify or rescind 
the handbooks at their own discretion, assuming they have made 
clear their intent not to form a binding contract. Rather, the point of 
handbooks is to help both employer and employee by making the 
conditions of the workplace more uniform and clear without limiting 
the employer’s ability to alter those conditions in the future as 
deemed necessary. Moreover, from an economic perspective, it is 
 
 71. See Doyle v. Holy Cross Hosp., 708 N.E.2d 1140, 1147 (Ill. 1999) (“Employers who 
choose to set forth policies in employee handbooks and manuals as an inducement to attracting 
and retaining a skilled and loyal work force cannot disregard those obligations at a later time, 
simply because the employer later perceives them to be inconvenient or burdensome.”). 
 72. Toroysan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., 662 A.2d 89 (Conn. 1995). 
 73. Id. at 98. 
 74. Id. at 98–99. 
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(arguably) inefficient to prevent employers from unilaterally 
modifying their own company policies once implemented.75 
Perhaps the most persuasive argument against requiring 
additional consideration is that proscribing unilateral modification of 
handbooks would be an unwieldy and impractical policy for 
employers to implement. Such a rule would become a logistical 
nightmare, as a company manual “could never be changed short of 
successful renegotiation with each employee who worked while the 
policy was in effect.”76 Problems with holdouts, dates of hiring, and 
various manuals that had been previously issued would mean that 
employers could have drastically different obligations to many 
different employees.77 For instance, a company might owe some of its 
employees who had accepted a modification no guarantees of process 
before dismissal, even though others could only be fired after 
progressive discipline, as they had never agreed to the additional 
consideration offered to modify an original handbook. The result 
would be to discourage employers from issuing handbooks altogether, 
or alternatively to provide manuals with especially vague terms and 
conditions. Consequently, the benefits gained by employees from 
having manuals78—even in the absence of concrete, legally 
enforceable rights—would be lost. 
Advocates of employee rights, however, could counter that 
businesses frequently self-impose situations in which they owe 
differing obligations to various employees, such as individualized pay 
rates. Consequently, the risk of owing different handbook-originated 
 
 75. Businesses, like market conditions, are ever-changing. If handbooks create rights for 
employees that cannot be unilaterally changed, then businesses would face significant obstacles 
preventing an efficient adjustment to the market. Bankey v. Storer Broad. Co., 443 N.W.2d 112, 
120 (Mich. 1989). Allowing unilateral modification by employers leaves businesses the flexibility 
presumably needed to meet evolving business necessities. See Pratt, supra note 3, at 218–19 
(“[T]he employer distributes the original handbook seeking to secure good will and increased 
productivity.”). 
 76. Bankey, 443 N.W.2d at 120. 
 77. Pratt, supra note 3, at 219. 
 78. Employees—like their employers—benefit from an orderly, cohesive workplace in 
which they (generally) know what to expect, even if those rights are not legally guaranteed. See 
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich. 1980) (“[W]here an 
employer chooses to establish such policies and practices and makes them known to its 
employees, the employment relationship is presumably enhanced. The employer secures an 
orderly, cooperative and loyal work force, and the employee the peace of mind associated with 
job security and the conviction that he will be treated fairly.”); Walters, supra note 4, at 381 
(noting that employers, through handbooks, “foster a loyal and orderly work environment and 
help to produce a more productive, cohesive work force”). 
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duties to different employees does not appear to be a great concern. 
But this argument fails when faced with the underlying purpose and 
nature of handbooks: to bring clarity and organization to the 
workforce so that it may be more efficient, orderly, and loyal.79 Thus, 
employers who originally promulgate handbooks to structure the 
workplace would refrain from doing so if they might have the 
opposite effect of making it less orderly, for example, by owing 
conflicting duties to various employees. Although differences in pay 
are often kept confidential80—often purposely by the employees 
themselves—varying handbook duties to employees would 
presumably be very public and foster discord among the workforce. 
For instance, employees who accept offered consideration for a 
modification might view those holding out as troublemakers, whereas 
“hold-outs” in turn might view the others as caving to the demands of 
the employer. Thus, the cumulative impact of this rule is to 
thoroughly discourage employers from creating handbooks in the first 
place. As a result, those courts that require additional consideration 
have created—for the vast majority of employers and employees 
alike—a recipe for disaster. 
b. Employers May Unilaterally Modify Handbooks.  Yet the 
other approach commonly used—permitting unilateral modification 
by the employer—can unquestionably be harsh: employers may make 
lavish promises to employees through handbooks, enticing them to 
work or continue to work (perhaps for lesser compensation), and 
then withdraw those promises at any time for their own convenience. 
For instance, in Grovier v. North Sound Bank81 an employee starting 
at a bank received a handbook stating that she would become a 
permanent employee after passing a probationary period, after which 
she could only be terminated for just cause.82 Two years later the bank 
rescinded this provision and eliminated sick leave as well as holiday 
and vacation pay.83 Moreover, the bank told her she would be 
 
 79. Slawson, supra note 9, at 24; Walters, supra note 4, at 381. 
 80. Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, “Love, Sex and Politics? Sure. Salary? No Way”: 
Workplace Social Norms and the Law, 25 BERKLEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 167, 168 (2004) 
(“[D]iscussion by individuals of their salaries . . . can be seen as violating an American ‘social 
norm.’”). 
 81. Grovier v. N. Sound Bank, 957 P.2d 811 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). 
 82. Id. at 813–14. 
 83. Id. at 814. 
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terminated if she did not sign the new handbook within three days.84 
The court upheld her dismissal for refusing to sign, arguing that “[t]he 
law should not tie employers to anachronistic policies in perpetuity.”85 
Likewise, Sadler v. Basin Electric Power Cooperative86 upheld an 
employee’s termination during a company restructuring despite his 
having been employed for four years and informed via handbook that 
permanent employees like him could only be fired for just cause.87 A 
handbook issued just before his firing defined just cause for the first 
time as including terminations for company restructuring.88 The court 
found for the employer, and it bluntly stated the absoluteness of the 
unilateral modification rule: “[T]he employer can define the work 
relationship. Once an employer takes action, for whatever reasons, an 
employee must either accept those changes, quit, or be discharged. 
Because the employer retains this control over the employment 
relationship, unilateral acts of the employer are binding on his 
employees and both parties should understand this rule.”89 
In response to the harshness of the rule permitting absolute 
unilateral modification, which would potentially open the door to all 
sorts of abuses by employers, the majority of courts permit employers 
to unilaterally modify only if they first provide reasonable notice to 
their employees.90 For instance, the California Supreme Court held in 
Asmus v. Pacific Bell 91 that a written promise of employment security 
could be unilaterally modified with reasonable notice, and it found 
that the two years after the promise’s modification was “ample” 
time.92 Although other courts follow this rule, no definitive statement 
has been adopted as to what constitutes “reasonable notice.”93 In 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 816. 
 86. Sadler v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 431 N.W.2d 296 (N.D. 1988). 
 87. Id. at 296–97. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 300 (quoting Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1087 (Wash. 
1984)). 
 90. Walters, supra note 4, at 387. 
 91. Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 999 P.2d 71, 80 (Cal. 2000). 
 92. Id. at 80.  
 93. Id. (“Employees were provided ample advance notice of the termination, and the 
present plaintiffs even enjoyed at least two more years of employment.”). The Sixth Circuit has 
said, alternatively, that one month may be valid, e.g., Highstone v. Westin Eng’g, Inc., 187 F.3d 
548, 553 (6th Cir. 1999), but also that mere distribution of the handbook counts, Mannix v. 
County of Monroe, 348 F.3d 526, 536 (6th Cir. 2003). Generally, it appears that courts only 
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Grovier, for instance, the court stated that reasonable notice meant 
no more than actual notice, and so an employee receiving a modified 
handbook alone was sufficient for the unilateral modification to be 
valid.94 An immediate concern over this lack of specificity is that if 
constructive or actual notice of a modification—such as through 
distribution of a new handbook—is all the notice required, the 
“reasonable notice” requirement becomes superfluous and dissolves 
back into the harshness of the pure unilateral modification rule 
because employers could still take advantage of their employees, just 
so long as they told them about it. In contrast, by giving employees 
fair warning of what is to come, the Asmus rule dulls the particularly 
sharp blade wielded by employers under the unilateral modification 
doctrine. 
But this toned-down version of the rule—requiring reasonable 
notice before unilateral modification is permissible—presents 
analytical problems. Although the courts that follow this reasoning 
say they do so applying traditional contract law,95 that claim rests on 
shaky legal ground.96 Assuming the initial issuance of the handbook 
was a valid offer accepted by the employee’s continuing to work, later 
allowing an employer to modify the handbook unilaterally soundly 
conflicts with traditional requirements for contract modification: the 
employee’s acceptance of the original offer means that the employer 
may not revoke because the acceptance creates an option contract 
that the employer may not unilaterally rescind or alter.97 Yet the 
offeror remains free to undo the option contract by providing 
additional consideration in exchange for its cancellation.98 Even 
though the result achieved by the Asmus approach may be more fair, 
the validity of its reasoning under contract principles is tenuous at 
best. Moreover, the vagueness among courts following this approach 
over what constitutes “reasonable” notice does little to resolve the 
confusion over handbook jurisprudence and may at times offer scant 
protection to abused workers. 
 
require that the employer make reasonable efforts to notify employees of the change. Apps, 
supra note 55, at 898. 
 94. Grovier v. N. Sound Bank, 957 P.2d 811, 817 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). 
 95. Walters, supra note 4, at 407. 
 96. Asmus, 999 P.2d at 82 (George, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s analysis is 
“entirely inconsistent with fundamental tenets of contract law”). 
 97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45 (1981); Walters, supra note 4, at 411. 
 98. Walters, supra note 4, at 416–17. 
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4. The Unfair Results of Handbook Disclaimers.  A “disclaimer” 
is exactly what it purports to be, that is, a statement in a handbook 
that disavows any notion that the handbook creates binding promises 
upon the employer. The general rule is that an employer can prevent 
the formation of a contract by making clear its intent not to make an 
offer, although a disclaimer is not necessarily dispositive.99 Some 
courts further require that the language be clear and conspicuous, and 
much litigation has resulted from whether a statement in a handbook 
claiming to disavow contractual liability meets the standard necessary 
to do so.100 Courts often place great emphasis on the presence or 
absence of disclaimers. Many, if not most, state that disclaimers 
usually prevent a handbook from being construed as an offer.101 The 
corollary is that the absence of a disclaimer makes the manual 
presumptively binding.102 This analysis is not uniform, however. For 
example, courts sometimes hold that even in the presence of 
disclaimers, a handbook may create a binding contract if the content 
of the manual substantially conflicts with the disclaimer.103 Similarly, 
the failure to expressly disclaim binding obligations may not have any 
effect on the analysis.104 Still, most courts hold that disclaimers 
expressly denying any intention to create a contractual offer 
effectively preclude the formation of any contractual obligation by 
the employer through the handbook.105 
 
 99. E.g., Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 540 N.W.2d 277, 287 (Iowa 1995); 82 AM. 
JUR. 2D Wrongful Discharge § 25 (2003). 
 100. Anderson, 540 N.W.2d at 287–88 (emphasizing that “[t]he requirement that a 
disclaimer be conspicuous has given rise to much litigation” before noting that “[a] disclaimer 
should be considered in the same manner as any other language in the handbook”). 
 101. Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1271 (N.J. 1985), modified, 499 
A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985) (stating that for an employer to avoid creating a contract, “[a]ll that need 
be done is the inclusion in a very prominent position of an appropriate statement that there is 
no promise of any kind by the employer contained in the manual”). 
 102. Keith J. Rosenblatt, New Jersey’s Recent Employment Manual Decisions: Traditional 
Contract Law Abandoned in Favor of an Employee’s Unreasonable Expectations, 25 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1496, 1505 (1995) (stating the rule as “absent an adequate disclaimer, an 
employer may be bound to the ‘promises’ made in an employee handbook, regardless of an 
employee’s at-will status.”). 
 103. See, e.g., Dillon v. Champion Jogbra, Inc., 819 A.2d 703, 708 (Vt. 2002) 
(“Notwithstanding the disclaimer on the first page . . . the manual goes on to establish . . . an 
elaborate system governing employee discipline and discharge.”). 
 104. See Bankey v. Storer Broad. Co., 443 N.W.2d 112, 113 (Mich. 1989) (“An employer 
may, without an express reservation of the right to do so, unilaterally change its written policy 
[in a handbook].”). 
 105. 82 AM. JUR. 2D Wrongful Discharge § 25 (2003). 
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This approach can, as expected, have particularly harsh 
consequences. Namely, employees who have either no written 
contract or particularly vague contracts may receive most of their 
terms of employment in a handbook containing a disclaimer. These 
handbooks can make especially grandiose promises regarding 
anything from compensation to vacation to dismissal procedures, and 
employees may quite reasonably come to rely on those promises, 
believing them to be binding. This may be particularly true in 
situations in which the disclaimer is largely buried, i.e., through 
placement, font, and the like, but is not legally inconspicuous. As a 
result, employees may work years under the expectation that certain 
promises in a handbook are enforceable and then be blindsided 
without recourse when the employer unilaterally modifies those 
promises. 
In contrast, employers who simply omit a disclaimer—perhaps 
negligently by not hiring an attorney to read through the manual—yet 
have no intention of creating binding promises may be bound in 
perpetuity to quite restrictive, even damaging promises. In particular, 
promises of “continued employment,” which may have been merely 
statements of good faith on the part of the employer to act fairly, 
could be construed as statements changing employment from at will 
to just cause. Thus, employers and employees alike may be unfairly 
harmed when courts place heavy reliance on disclaimers. 
II.  PROPOSED RULES FOR HANDBOOK MODIFICATION 
A. A Threshold Matter: Why Handbooks Should Be Enforceable 
Before discussing what the rules should be regarding 
modification of handbooks, it is important to answer the threshold 
question of why handbooks should ever be given legally binding force 
at all. First, in many instances employee handbooks may provide the 
only concrete description of the employment relationship. Many 
employers leave crucially important terms and conditions of an 
employee’s work for a handbook, including terms such as vacation 
time, bonuses, just cause, disciplinary procedures, and so forth.106 
Refusing to find handbooks enforceable would make any 
employment remedy in favor of the employee nearly nonexistent, as 
employers could inequitably put nearly all the promises of the 
 
 106. Arnow-Richman, supra note 34, at 2. 
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relationship into the handbook, knowing these promises would be 
unenforceable.107 It would be a bizarre rule that would leave judicially 
unregulated, either contractually or equitably, a relationship as 
fundamentally important to people’s lives as their relationship with 
an employer. Second, employers issue handbooks for their own 
benefit.108 To allow them the advantage provided by the handbook 
without any reciprocal detriment would smack of injustice. Finally, 
employees rely on handbooks.109 Frequently they do so at the 
insistence of their employers, who often require them to sign or 
acknowledge receipt or having read the handbook as a condition of 
beginning employment.110 Thus, employers expect employees to rely 
on handbooks and employees are cognizant of that expectation, so 
enforcing the handbooks’ provisions would not be unfairly catching 
the employer or employee off guard. 
B. Proposed Rules 
1. The Requirement of Additional Consideration Is Abandoned, 
but the Unilateral Modification Rule Must in Turn Adopt a Proper 
Reasonableness Standard.  Based on the problems discussed,111 
requiring additional consideration is neither practical nor desirable 
before an employer may modify a handbook; allowing absolute 
unilateral modification, however, produces unjust and harsh results. 
The answer is to tone down the absolute modification rule, which 
 
 107. See Small v. Springs Indus., 357 S.E.2d 452, 455 (S.C. 1987) (“It is patently unjust to 
allow an employer to couch a handbook, bulletin, or other similar material in mandatory terms 
and then allow him to ignore these very policies as ‘a gratuitous, nonbinding statement of 
general policy’ whenever it works to his advantage.” (quoting Walker v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 335 S.E.2d 79, 83 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985))); Pratt, supra note 3, at 210 (“If company policies 
are not worth the paper on which they are printed, then it would be better not to mislead 
employees by distributing them.”). 
 108. Pratt, supra note 3, at 213. 
 109. Courts often use employees’ reliance on a handbook’s terms as a threshold matter for 
determining whether the handbook is legally enforceable. See, e.g., Demasse v. ITT Corp., 984 
P.2d 1138, 1147 (Ariz. 1999) (holding that commitments in a handbook are enforceable if they 
may be reasonably relied upon by employees). Other courts are even more categorical as to 
reliance: “[Having been] issue[d] a handbook, an employee may rely on the provisions to state a 
claim for relief.” Jones v. Denver Pub. Sch., 427 F.3d 1315, 1323 (10th Cir. 2005). That 
employees sue at all to enforce handbooks suggests that they regarded the handbooks terms as 
in some way binding. 
 110. See Pratt, supra note 3, at 206 (“Some employers require each employee to read and 
sign her manual.”). 
 111. See discussion supra Part I.B.3.a. 
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courts in essence do when they require reasonable notice before 
unilateral modification, as in Asmus.112 Yet reasonable notice is not 
the panacea that courts might purport it to be, as no clear notion of 
what constitutes “reasonable notice” has yet been determined. An 
ever-present risk remains that by not setting a clear time requirement 
for reasonable notice, the Asmus rule effectively dissolves back into 
the unforgiving rule permitting unilateral modification at any time. 
Thus the mission is for courts to ensure that “reasonable notice” is, in 
fact, reasonable to make its promise of overcoming the harshness of 
unilateral modification more than illusory. 
2. Defining “Reasonable” Notice for Handbook Modification 
Depends upon the Nature of the Promise Being Amended.  If the 
“reasonable notice” requirement of the Asmus rule is what prevents 
the unilateral modification of handbooks from having unduly harsh 
consequences, what constitutes “reasonable” must be established. 
The rule dissolves back into its unjust progenitor if “reasonable 
notice” does not provide an adequate benefit to the employee; in 
other words, the notice must provide the means by which employees 
can in some way enforce the benefits they originally accepted by 
continuing to work after receipt of the manual. Even though several 
courts have adopted a rule similar to that in Asmus,113 there is yet no 
uniform approach as to what constitutes reasonable notice.114 
Moreover, there is not a particularly large amount of precedent on 
this issue. Some courts merely look at the manner in which the 
modification was imparted to the employees, upholding the unilateral 
change so long as the “method employed [is] uniform and 
reasonable.”115 They tend to hold that so long as constructive notice is 
given, the change is valid.116 Others also look at the length of time 
provided to the employee before the change takes place. For 
example, in Asmus, the plaintiffs were given five months’ notice 
before the policy took effect and worked for two years after the 
modified policy was in place; the court found this “ample advance 
 
 112. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text. 
 113. See Walters, supra note 4, at 398 (noting specifically California, North Dakota, Utah, 
and Virginia).  
 114. See Apps, supra note 55, at 897–98 (detailing various courts’ time frames). 
 115. Grow v. Gen. Prods., Inc., 457 N.W.2d 167, 171 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990). 
 116. Apps, supra note 55, at 898. 
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notice.”117 Likewise, the Sixth Circuit has said that one month’s 
advance notice was reasonable.118 
For notice to be reasonable it should meet both prongs, namely, 
that the modification of the handbook be reasonable in manner and 
time. Accordingly, this Note argues that for notice to be reasonable 
(1) it must include a time requirement, and (2) the amount of time 
necessary should vary depending upon the nature of the promise. 
a. The Necessity of a Time Requirement.  Courts that allow 
unilateral modification without requiring any time delay before the 
modification takes effect miss a major point of why reasonable notice 
should be required in the first place. If unilateral modification is at 
times unjust precisely because the employer can invoke it at any 
moment on a whim, then simply requiring the employer to tell 
employees about the change does not resolve the problem at all. 
Instead, the employer should be required to allow a sufficient amount 
of time to give employees fair warning, a period in which they may 
still assert their rights should the employer attempt to make the 
modified handbook take effect immediately. 
The immediate issue is how anyone can pick a time that is 
“reasonable.” In so doing, a court should necessarily consider the 
position of the employee, i.e., the time needed to consider the new 
policy and even find other employment if the changes are 
unpalatable. At the same time, the position of the employer should be 
a factor. For instance, any time an employer can show absolute 
business necessity—more than simply changed business conditions—
the modification should be immediately allowed. Finally, the amount 
of time necessary to be “reasonable” should be based on the type of 
promise made, as employees likely place much greater importance on 
some types of promises—for example, those relating to compensation 
may be more zealously guarded than disciplinary procedures. 
A time requirement would resolve the fundamental 
inconsistency inherent in evaluating employer modification: it would 
bridge the gap between an employer’s intent not to bind itself to 
handbook policies and an employee’s expectations that those 
promises are not meaningless. Granted it is not a perfect solution; 
 
 117. Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 999 P.2d 71, 73 (Cal. 2000) (stating the rule that an employer could 
unilaterally modify an employment handbook “after a reasonable time, on reasonable notice, 
and without interfering with the employee’s vested benefits”). 
 118. Highstone v. Westin Eng’g, Inc., 187 F.3d 548, 553 (6th Cir. 1999). 
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employees would still face the prospect that the procedures and 
policies under which they have been employed may be modified in 
the future at the sole discretion of their employer. But they would at 
least know that such changes cannot take place immediately but 
rather only after they have been given a fair chance to consider what 
is at stake. 
b. The Amount of Time That Is Reasonable Should Vary 
Depending upon the Promise.  The amount of time that is reasonable 
should depend upon the nature of the benefits at stake, with 
modifications that involve promises affecting substantive rights 
requiring longer notice to be valid than those impacting largely 
procedural rights. For benefits that are largely procedural—such as 
disciplinary procedures—the amount of time deemed reasonable 
should be particularly small, for example, perhaps just a few days and 
no more than one month. This length accords with the reasonable 
expectations of the employee: although some particular employees 
might place paramount emphasis on a company’s disciplinary 
procedures,119 it is doubtful that the majority of employees place as 
much importance on such promises as they do for substantive ones.120 
Substantive changes almost surely affect employees’ personal lives—
for instance, by changing compensation or vacation time—whereas 
procedural changes, like changes to disciplinary procedures for a 
model employee, may never impact an employee at all. Employees 
most likely are able to adapt more easily to procedural rather than 
substantive changes, and so less notice is required. 
In either case, the importance of allowing an employer to change 
its internal operating procedures substantially outweighs the 
relatively small importance placed upon those policies by the 
employee. Thus, the requisite time needed to modify should be small. 
Because one business week is ordinarily adequate for other business-
 
 119. For instance, imagine an employee who previously had been dismissed for a job after 
cruising the Internet in violation of company policy although the employee was unaware it was 
wrong to do so. In the future, the employee might be more inclined to accept an offer from a 
company that requires an initial warning for minor infractions before termination is 
appropriate. 
 120. Courts typically do not require actual notice, in part, because employees often do not 
read their employment manuals at all. E.g., Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 540 N.W.2d 
277, 285 (Iowa 1995) (noting that the plaintiff did not read the handbook). But just because 
employees have not read the manual should not imply that they are not aware of its contents. 
Employees are probably made aware of major provisions (and violations of them) by other 
coworkers or the employer itself. 
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related activities, it seems an adequate minimum for notice to be 
“reasonable” for handbook modifications. Additionally, it is easy to 
infer from an employer who feels a compelling need to change a 
handbook provision immediately (in less than one week) that it is 
doing so in bad faith or from improper motives. For instance, the 
employer may be altering commission rates just before several 
employees complete a large sale. Thus, one week should not be an 
unreasonable burden upon employers to wait for changes to take 
effect. 
At the other end of the spectrum are those provisions that 
specifically involve substantive promises, such as statements 
concerning wages, raises, and bonuses. Employees who have already 
performed work under a promise of compensation made in an 
employment manual should always be entitled to that pay. Courts 
should be most hesitant to allow employers to modify these promises 
on short notice as they are undeniably fundamental to the 
employment relationship. Employees who have their compensation 
altered are probably much more likely to consider seeking 
employment elsewhere than those who have procedural rights 
changed and hence need adequate time to do so. An adequate period 
may be one business quarter, or roughly three months. This span is a 
basic unit by which businesses measure their recent productivity and 
make fundamental business decisions concerning their future 
actions.121 
Troublesome situations arise when employees are promised 
procedures that directly affect substantive rights, such as rules that 
provide for standard-track promotions, raises, advances, etc. These 
circumstances necessarily involve a blend of procedure and substance, 
making it more difficult to determine the weight that should be 
accorded such provisions. Consider, for example, a fairly typical 
employment manual that sets forth the conditions for applying for 
and receiving tenure for a college professor. Here the rules 
specifically concern the procedure that is to be followed by the 
college and the professor in the course of the employment 
relationship, but they also significantly impact the professor’s 
 
 121. See ANDREA SAVERI ET AL., INST. FOR THE FUTURE, TOWARD A NEW LITERACY OF 
COOPERATION IN BUSINESS: MANAGING DILEMMAS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 53 (Maureen Davis 
ed., 2004) (“Entrepreneurial capitalism, typified by the United States, is rooted in individual 
entrepreneurialism and free market principles, organized around the business quarter as its 
main timeframe.”). 
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substantive rights, notably the professor’s promotion, salary, and job 
security. In such circumstances, the amount of time necessary would 
be more fact dependent, but the general principles would still apply.122 
The proper time frame for such promises would fall in between the 
two time frames mentioned, i.e., one week to three months, and could 
be adjusted toward either end of the range depending on whether the 
change is more procedural or more substantive. 
Promises that an employee can be terminated only for just cause 
are similarly problematic, for this situation too deals with rights both 
substantive (being fired) and procedural (allowing the employee 
notice and a hearing). These cases would likely be highly fact 
dependent. Ordinarily, courts should be wary about attributing too 
much weight to supposed just cause provisions, as employers may 
commonly include language that resembles such a promise but 
without the intention of changing the employee’s status from at will.123 
Instead, the employer is simply stating its own desire, in general, not 
to dismiss employees without reason, but it is by no means binding 
itself. Nonetheless, when courts do find that provisions in a handbook 
give rise to a promise that an employee can only be fired for just 
cause, modification should require a reasonable amount of time equal 
to that of changed compensation, that is, one business quarter, as just-
cause provisions are closely akin to promises of payment.124 
As recommended in this Part, ordinarily the shortest time that 
could be considered “reasonable” should be one week, and the 
longest necessary would be three months. Yet several circumstances 
could alter these periods. Specific cases may, in the interest of justice 
for either the employer or employee, require either a shorter or 
longer span respectively. Additionally, employers should be allowed 
to show that they follow a separate, internal practice to essentially 
establish their own standard intervals. For instance, a company with 
regular two-month reviews that are used to establish compensation 
would have a legitimate argument that the three-month threshold for 
unilaterally modifying wage provisions in a handbook should be 
 
 122. For a more complete discussion of what constitutes “reasonable notice” in this 
situation, see supra Part III.C. 
 123. Employers may make statements of their general desire not to fire people, such as “So 
long as your work is performed satisfactorily, you will always have a place at Company X.” This 
sort of statement, however, is probably better characterized as simply an offer of good will than 
any real intention to create a binding just-cause contract. 
 124. For example, employees may elect to take lower pay with the expectation that they 
cannot be fired without good reason. 
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reduced to reflect its own adopted two-month period. Such an 
approach on the surface would be reasonable as employees would 
have come to reasonably expect it. In the absence of mitigating 
circumstances or specific employer practices, the suggested guidelines 
could be applied across the board. 
Case law justifies such an approach, as various courts have 
implicitly adopted a reasonable length of time approach to finding an 
employer’s unilateral modification valid.125 Nevertheless, this Note’s 
approach is difficult to square with traditional contract principles.126 
Applying contract law strictly to handbook cases would have either of 
two negative effects: (1) employers would have to provide additional 
consideration to modify, which is undesirable, or (2) courts trying to 
do the right thing in employment cases would further bend contract 
law into bizarre shapes. Consequently, courts should be willing to 
abandon their reliance on contract law as a beacon to guide them 
through the fog of employment decisions. Searching for a reasonable 
time requirement is not a contract-based solution but rather one 
founded on notions of fairness uniquely aimed at the employment 
relationship. 
3. As a Further Step toward Fairness, Disclaimers Should Be 
Entirely Irrelevant.  An initial step toward achieving the goal of 
fundamental fairness would be to eliminate from handbook analysis 
the typically heavy reliance courts place on the existence or absence 
of disclaimers. Those cases that follow the majority approach 
regarding disclaimers—using them effectively as a per se rule against 
finding an implied contract in a handbook—reveal the underlying 
problem behind looking at disclaimers in general: disclaimers are 
weighted too heavily. In reality, disclaimers say very little about the 
intentions of the employer issuing the handbook or the employee 
relying upon it. The argument in favor of a bright-line rule is that 
disclaimers reveal the employer’s true intent to avoid creating a 
contract and that no reasonable employee could therefore conclude 
the handbook was an offer.127 Employers generally would prefer that 
 
 125. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 126. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 127. Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 540 N.W.2d 277, 287–88 (Iowa 1995) (“A 
disclaimer can prevent the formation of a contract by clarifying the intent of the employer not to 
make an offer. . . . [W]e simply examine the language and context of the disclaimer to decide 
whether a reasonable employee . . . would understand it to mean that the employer has not 
assented to be bound by the handbook’s provisions.”). 
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disclaimers prohibit the creation of a contract, for they would almost 
always prefer to limit their liability to their employees.128 The 
problem, then, is that employers can promise too much if they know 
they can always avoid being contractually bound. Courts, of course, 
do recognize this and sometimes ignore disclaimers in such 
instances.129 Yet by viewing disclaimers as an absolute bar or even 
presumptively favoring them, courts implicitly favor the position of 
employers; i.e., they unfairly reduce or eliminate employer liability to 
employees despite the benefits gained by the employer in issuing the 
handbook. At the same time, courts may sometimes penalize 
businesses that simply omit a disclaimer or do not word it strongly 
enough. It is difficult to understand why, if courts assume that 
employers generally do not want to be bound by the terms in their 
handbooks, the presence (or absence) of language stating exactly that 
becomes determinative. If courts recognize the competing forces at 
issue behind all handbook litigation—employers’ desire to disclaim 
and employees’ reliance on the handbook—there is no compelling 
reason to consider disclaimers beyond unnecessary reliance on 
traditional contract analysis.130 
In addition to the basic unfairness of allowing disclaimers to 
preclude liability is the practical problem that examining and creating 
rules governing when disclaimers are effective is a legal mess. Courts 
analyzing handbooks for implied contracts usually take a two-step 
 
 128. Professor David Slawson argues that employers would prefer the additional 
consideration for unilateral modification rule as it would provide a tool for retaining employees. 
Slawson, supra note 9, at 30, 32. His argument is unpersuasive for two reasons: first, an 
employer who did want to expressly provide a just-cause provision to employees could do so 
through a written contract separate from the handbook; and, second, employers who want to 
retain employees through promises in a handbook would simply not violate those promises (by 
unilaterally modifying them) in the first place. 
 129. E.g., Dillon v. Champion Jogbra, Inc., 819 A.2d 703, 708 (Vt. 2002) (“[T]he presence of 
such a disclaimer is not dispositive . . . .”). 
 130. This overemphasis on disclaimers is another regrettable result stemming from the 
union of contract and employment law. Specifically, disclaimers are used by courts as evidence 
of what a reasonable employee would believe the bargain to be; in other words, it is considered 
part of a contract between individual parties. Employment manuals—often the only source of 
terms defining the employment relation—should, however, be considered representative of the 
symbiotic employer-employee relationship. Yet, Professor Slawson takes the position that 
unilateral modification without additional consideration should be allowed provided an 
employer “had the foresight to reserve the right to do so.” Slawson, supra note 9, at 28. This 
position demonstrates the basic problem: if courts are more concerned about achieving 
equitable results in employment than ordinarily with contracts, simply having the “foresight” to 
add one or two lines to an otherwise voluminous employment manual should have very little 
determinative weight. 
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analysis: first, they inquire whether a disclaimer is valid, and if so, 
they turn to whether the handbook has created a binding contract.131 
The type of analysis used when looking at disclaimers is particularly 
tedious. Courts often determine a disclaimer’s conspicuousness by 
examining everything from the language and placement of the 
disclaimer to its font, size, color, and location.132 Because the presence 
of a disclaimer is often not determinative as a matter of law of 
whether a contract has been formed or not,133 courts’ analysis of 
handbooks requires an extra step in litigation, i.e., initially 
determining the validity of the disclaimer. In addition, courts’ 
decisionmaking processes become much more subjective as they must 
inquire whether a reasonable employee would have found the 
particular disclaimer at issue sufficiently conspicuous to avoid 
creating a binding contract. 
Entirely disregarding disclaimers could eliminate much of the 
uncertainty involved in handbook jurisprudence. In addition, such a 
step would free courts from the often minute and tedious inquiries 
they must make concerning the clarity of a disclaimer. In the end, the 
use of disclaimers flows completely from the application of contract 
law to the employment situation—their presence indicates the 
employer’s desire not to create an offer. Recognizing the employment 
relationship as one of status would allow courts to abandon this 
overemphasis on disclaimers, which has particularly unjust results by 
absolutely denying employees entrance to the courtroom.134 
C. Objections to These Rules and Their Responses 
Immediate concerns with the rules proposed in this Note include 
the possibilities that (1) employers who modify many provisions in a 
handbook would face practical difficulties because each change would 
 
 131. See, e.g., Anderson, 540 N.W.2d at 288–89 (“When examining the disclaimer we first 
consider the text employed. . . . Second, we examine the scope of the disclaimer.”). 
 132. See, e.g., Durtsche v. Am. Colloid Co., 958 F.2d 1007, 1010–11 (10th Cir. 1992) 
(rejecting a disclaimer that “was buried in a glossary definition, and there was no effort to 
highlight the fact or the effect of the disclaimer”); Chambers v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 721 F. Supp. 
1128, 1131 (D. Ariz. 1988) (enforcing a disclaimer displayed conspicuously in bold print in 
introductory paragraph); Kumpf v. United Tel. Co., 429 S.E.2d 869, 872 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993) 
(holding a disclaimer inconspicuous when “located on the last page of the document under the 
heading ‘CONCLUSION’. . . . [because] [i]t was neither capitalized, bolded, set apart with 
distinctive border, or in contrasting type or color”). 
 133. 82 AM. JUR. 2D Wrongful Discharge § 25 (2003). 
 134. For further detail on the sometimes unjust results that reliance on disclaimers can have, 
see supra Part I.B.4. 
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require a different length of time before it would be “reasonable”; (2) 
a good faith standard applied to employer modification could more 
easily achieve the same desirable results; and (3) ignoring disclaimers 
would dissuade employers from ever issuing handbooks at all, which 
would in turn harm employees. 
An initial concern with the approach suggested by this Note is 
that because the length of time required for modification to be 
reasonable depends upon the nature of the provision changed, 
different lengths of time would have to pass before all of a 
handbook’s provisions would become valid. The result, therefore, 
would be a staggered effect in which various modifications are 
permitted at varying intervals. Analogously, under the additional 
consideration approach, employers might potentially owe different 
obligations to different employees depending upon who received 
what version of the handbook and who has accepted the modification. 
Under this Note’s approach, employers could face a comparable 
situation in which they modify a handbook’s provisions regarding 
disciplinary procedures, just-cause provisions, and compensatory 
promises at once, and as a result, the amount of reasonable notice 
required for each modification would differ. The worry is that this 
would be confusing for employers to administer and difficult for 
employees to understand. 
There are several counterarguments. First, the modified 
handbook would still be uniform among the employees, so it would 
avoid the primary evils of the additional consideration approach. 
Specifically, employers would not have to administer policies that 
affect individual employees differently, and employees would not face 
the internal discord that may arise when they are treated differently 
by the employer depending upon who has agreed to the new 
handbook. Second, the employer would know when its various 
modifications come into effect, so it would not be particularly 
troublesome to implement administratively. Similarly, employees 
would benefit from the more bright-line knowledge of what fair 
warning they deserve from employers wishing to modify the terms of 
their employment. Third, claims likely would arise only when the lack 
of notice was egregious concerning one of the provisions in the 
contract, and so courts would not have to sort through various time 
issues for each provision of the handbook. Finally, this approach 
would fairly represent the reasonable expectations of both parties, in 
particular the employees. Simply put, it is more reasonable to expect 
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that an employer can flexibly alter its procedural policies than its pay 
schedules. 
Another objection is that the concept of good faith, if rigorously 
applied, could likewise eliminate the rough edges of the unilateral 
modification rule.135 More specifically, courts could apply a good faith 
standard to the acts of employers, prohibiting unilateral modification 
in instances when an employer’s act was duplicitous, e.g., altering 
commission rates just before an employee closes a large sale or 
eliminating a large promise intended to attract employees. If so, then 
traditional contract principles could continue to be applied without 
doctrinal inconsistency or the problem of unfair results. Good faith 
fails, however, because it takes into account only the employer’s 
position. Thus, employers who grossly abuse their use of employment 
manuals to make promises to employees would be prohibited from 
doing so under the good faith doctrine. But employers who act in 
good or neutral faith in modifying their manuals would still be able to 
do so without providing reasonable notice. For example, an employer 
may state in a handbook that all employees may only be fired for just 
cause; one year later, however, the employer feels an economic 
downturn coming and returns all employees to at-will status. Doing so 
would not be in bad faith—nonetheless, immediately modifying the 
employees’ status without reasonable notice is unjust to them. In this 
analysis, employees’ positions are entirely ignored; demanding that 
employers provide fair warning is more a safeguard to protect 
employees than it is to ensure that employers are not acting for 
improper motives. 
A final objection concerns the practical effect of denying 
handbook disclaimers any legal force. Opponents of this Note’s 
position might readily counter that by removing any legal significance 
from disclaimers, employers would be less likely to issue handbooks 
at all, thus discouraging a practice that benefits employees as well as 
employers. Employers could not be certain that the handbooks would 
not create binding obligations. There are several counterarguments. 
First, employers might still issue handbooks when they find that the 
benefits derived from them outweigh the risks of litigation involving 
one of the handbook’s promises. Due to this fear of litigation, 
 
 135. See Apps, supra note 55, at 916 (arguing that good faith can limit how employers may 
modify a handbook, because good faith requires that the employer only exercise its power “in a 
manner which does not destroy the relationship of mutual trust and confidence between the 
parties”). 
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employers issuing handbooks would probably make their language 
more precise and contain less lavish promises, in effect promoting the 
goal of clarity in the employment relationship. Second, as argued in 
this Part, employers should be allowed to modify unilaterally upon 
reasonable notice, and so even if they are bound for a time, they 
would always be able to subsequently modify without providing 
additional consideration. Hence, the benefits of the handbook would 
seem even greater next to the prospect of abiding by the handbook’s 
promises for at least the short term. 
III.  CONFLICTING APPROACHES TO HANDBOOK ANALYSIS 
This Part provides three examples of fairly common workplace 
arrangements and ensuing employer-employee conflicts. For each, it 
illustrates how courts might resolve the conflict under various 
approaches, and then demonstrates how courts should decide the 
matter following the rules proposed by this Note. 
A. John 
An employee, John, works as a salesman on a commission basis; 
his pay rates have been specified only in an employment handbook he 
received two years previously. He received no written contract. The 
handbook contains a disclaimer, which states only that “The 
company’s Sales Plan does not constitute an offer by Company X.” 
The rate of compensation he receives is highly favorable compared to 
other employers in the market, and so John has turned down other 
attractive job offers. Presently, he earns 30 percent for each sale he 
makes, but his employer issues a new handbook reducing that amount 
to 10 percent starting in two days. John is presently working on a sale 
which he thinks will be completed in one week. He sues four months 
later for all the commissions he was denied at the 30 percent rate after 
the new handbook was issued. 
The approaches taken by various courts could decide this in one 
of several different ways. First, without a clear intent to form a 
contract, the handbook could not have created an offer in the first 
place, and so John has no recourse.136 Second, the handbook might 
have created an offer, but the disclaimer effectively prevents it from 
 
 136. See, e.g., Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661, 661 (Mo. 1988) 
(declining to adopt a “handbook exception”). 
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being so, and John has no recourse.137 Third, the disclaimer could be 
ignored in light of the nature of the other promises in the manual and 
the employer must provide John with additional consideration to 
change the handbook.138 Thus, John is entitled to the 30 percent rate 
for all sales. Fourth, the handbook did create a valid offer, but the 
employer may modify it at any time without additional consideration, 
and John has no recourse.139 Fifth, the handbook did create a valid 
offer and the employer could modify by providing “reasonable 
notice;” John has recourse only if the notification was not 
reasonable.140 
Besides illustrating the multiple and conflicting approaches taken 
by different courts, this example is a simple vehicle for demonstrating 
the flaws of courts’ present approaches to handbooks. A categorical 
refusal to find handbooks binding on employers would be unfair to 
employees, like John, whose pay rates have only been established by 
a handbook. Allowing an employer to evade liability by grace of a 
clearly worded disclaimer similarly reproduces this problem. But 
requiring Company X to provide additional consideration to all 
salesmen would be a tremendous burden on the employer. For 
example, if the employer settles with most of its salespersons but John 
holds out for more, the employer may be left in the unenviable 
position of having various members of its sales force receiving various 
compensation rates, which would be administratively difficult and 
could foster disgruntled feelings among the employees. Yet allowing 
the employer to unilaterally modify the handbook is also 
unsatisfactory. John has remained loyal to his employer specifically 
because of the excellent pay rates he receives; in addition, he is about 
to receive a large commission which the employer erases by 
modifying the handbook. The most attractive solution, therefore, is 
 
 137. See, e.g., Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 540 N.W.2d 277 (Iowa 1995) (holding 
that an explicit disclaimer bars a handbook from constituting an offer to modify an employee’s 
at-will employment).  
 138. See, e.g., Demasse v. ITT Corp., 984 P.2d 1138, 1144 (Ariz. 1999) (“Once an 
employment contract is formed . . . a party may no longer unilaterally modify the terms of that 
relationship.”). 
 139. E.g., Grovier v. N. Sound Bank, 957 P.2d 811, 815 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (“An 
employer may unilaterally amend or revoke policies and procedures established in an employee 
handbook.”). 
 140. E.g., Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 999 P.2d 71, 73 (Cal. 2000) (“An employer may unilaterally 
terminate a policy . . . after a reasonable time, on reasonable notice . . . .”). 
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adopting a “reasonable notice” standard for the employer’s 
modification. 
Following the rules proposed by this Note, a court evaluating this 
case should initially discard the disclaimer as irrelevant to the 
analysis. Then, it should determine the type of promise at issue—in 
this case, a substantive compensatory provision, which, as suggested, 
should receive maximum deference for the length of time required to 
be reasonable. Here, the employer provided notice of only one week, 
which ordinarily should be regarded as insufficient warning to the 
employee of a change affecting compensation. The drastic size of the 
change (30 percent to 10 percent) indicates that John may very well 
desire to find a more attractive position elsewhere and should receive 
sufficient time to do it. In the absence of showing an actual business 
need, the employer may be trying to unfairly profit by its employees’ 
previous reliance on the high commissions, further indicated by the 
fact that John is about to close a large deal just days after the changes 
will take effect. 
As a result, John should be entitled to the 30 percent commission 
rate for all of those sales made in the three months after notice of the 
change was made. For the sales made in the fourth month, the court 
should determine that John’s notice was by then reasonable and that 
he is entitled to only the 10 percent commission rate. Although this 
result is not doctrinally sanctioned by contract law, it is more 
reasonable to both parties than results that would have entailed a 
harsh result to either John or his employer. 
B. Jane 
Jane goes to work for a manufacturer and receives a one 
hundred-page handbook. She acknowledges receipt of that handbook 
in writing. The employer makes no other oral or written promises to 
her. The handbook does not include a disclaimer, and it describes the 
process by which Jane may become a permanent employee at the 
company. Specifically, her first ninety days are her “probation 
period,” after which she will be evaluated, and if her work is 
acceptable, she will be offered a “permanent position for as long as 
she chooses to remain with the company.” One year later, the 
company issues a revision to the manual stating that all employees are 
at will and that the handbook is not meant to create a binding 
contract with any employee. Jane is fired in another six months, 
despite having passed her probationary period. She sues, claiming 
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that she is a permanent employee who, under the terms of the manual 
she signed, can only be fired for just cause. 
Under the rules proposed in this Note, Jane’s employer should 
be entitled to summary judgment. The absence of a disclaimer in the 
initial handbook should be disregarded by the court, as should the 
later addition of a disclaimer. Next, because her termination occurred 
sufficiently far after the modification (six months), she received 
reasonable notice of the employer’s unilateral modification, and so it 
was valid. In the absence of a clear contractual agreement changing 
Jane’s status from an at-will employee, Jane gained no further rights 
through the initial handbook and so has no recourse. 
But under other analyses, this case might not be so simple. For 
instance, courts that place heavy weight on the absence of a 
disclaimer would probably conclude that initially the handbook 
created a binding, implied contract and so Jane is entitled to 
damages.141 Thus, the employer is penalized for neglecting to include 
an initial disclaimer. And if the ultimate objective is fundamental 
fairness, it seems odd to hold one employer liable and another not 
based solely on the inclusion of a one-sentence disclaimer at the end 
of a one hundred-page manual. Practically, it is doubtful that Jane’s 
expectations changed dramatically based on the absence or inclusion 
of the disclaimer. Similarly, if the employer truly wanted to create 
binding obligations upon itself, it could have done so expressly; 
instead, holding it liable is a large penalty to pay for a relatively slight 
oversight. 
Even after placing analysis of the disclaimer to the side, courts 
would still reach widely disparate, and often unjust, results. In 
jurisdictions that require additional consideration for modification, 
Jane’s continuing to work after receiving the modified handbook is 
insufficient to constitute acceptance, and so she would win damages. 
On the other hand, courts that adamantly refuse to recognize 
handbooks as ever creating employee rights would dismiss the case 
outright. Both approaches claim to use black-letter contract law in 
deciding Jane’s case, yet they reach diametrically opposed results. As 
a result, contract law becomes less clear, and employees and 
employers alike face uncertain outcomes when deciding whether to 
litigate. 
 
 141. See, e.g., Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1258 (N.J. 1985), 
modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985) (finding a just-cause provision in a handbook enforceable 
when no disclaimer is present). 
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In addition, other courts may get bogged down in the specific 
language of the initial provision offering “permanent employment,” 
debating whether a reasonable employee would deem that a promise 
that she would only be fired for just cause.142 Still others, like the court 
in Asmus, might reach the same conclusion suggested by this Note—
summary judgment for the employer—but would attend to the 
tedious contract analysis involving the disclaimer and whether an 
offer and acceptance had actually occurred in the first place. 
The unfortunate result in all of these other contexts is that the 
arguably fair result, permitting the employer’s modification without 
penalty, requires a much greater degree of legal legwork before it is 
reached. Thus, the courts’ time and resources are wasted on 
particularly tedious and jurisdictionally inconsistent analysis. This 
harms the courts, employees, and employers alike. 
C. Fred 
Fred receives a written contract as a professor at a local 
university, but it states only his salary for the present year. Typically, 
he renews a similar contract each year. Fred also receives a handbook 
which is reissued every year, detailing the procedures that both 
professors and the university’s board are to follow in deciding 
whether faculty will receive tenure. Fred is halfway through the 
process, which ordinarily takes six years. The handbook he receives 
this year, however, is decidedly different from previous versions he 
has received. This handbook entirely overhauls the tenure track 
procedures, providing simply that after this semester, the university 
will make tenure decisions at its own discretion. Fred is denied tenure 
without being informed why and sues, claiming the university owed 
him the process it had previously established. 
In this case, courts that follow traditional contract principles, that 
is, those that require additional consideration or even use promissory 
estoppel, seem to get this right: the university cannot alter the 
promises it made to Fred because an option contract was created 
when Fred continued to teach under the promises of the initial 
handbook. Thus, the university must provide the procedures it had 
originally put in place for Fred. But because the additional 
consideration approach is generally unsatisfactory,143 other courts 
 
 142. See supra note 132. 
 143. See discussion supra Part I.B.3.a. 
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might turn to the Asmus rule of reasonable notice. Here, Fred has 
probably received reasonable notice—an entire semester and 
constructive notice—under a contract-based approach. Yet this 
solution is undesirable based on the extent of what Fred has lost: 
several years of work and preparation have vanished. Likewise, 
courts that outright reject obligations arising from employment 
handbooks would unfairly deny Fred any remedy. 
What would be preferable, therefore, would be an 
“employment,” rather than contract, reaction to whether Fred has 
received reasonable notice. This is not an easy case to resolve, even 
under this Note’s approach. For instance, allowing Fred to continue 
his tenure track on the terms of the original contract—which he 
wants—would force the university to abide by outdated policies for 
another three years, policies which would not apply to other 
professors. On the other hand, a court’s decision that six months’ time 
is normally adequate notice would deny Fred a remedy entirely. The 
“best” result would involve either creative, equitable relief by which 
Fred would receive some form of the process he was denied, or 
compensatory relief for the value of the time he has spent under the 
assumptions of the original handbook. No clear solution appears; this 
approach, however, points the way toward the two parties settling, 
rather than providing either with an easy victory that would unfairly 
and one-sidedly harm the other. 
Although this Note’s approach is fairly open-ended in this case, it 
offers a chance to avoid the harshness and rigidity of the two options 
contracts analysis offers, either requiring complete obeisance by the 
university to the terms of the original handbook or rejecting Fred’s 
claim entirely. 
CONCLUSION 
To reduce the often harsh and unjust impact that an employer’s 
use of manuals can have upon employees, a majority of courts 
recognize that employers who issue handbooks to their workforce 
may create contractual obligations.144 But courts remain largely 
divided on the legal analysis that should be used in approaching the 
issue of an employer’s obligations flowing from the issuance of a 
handbook and the more problematic question of what happens when 
 
 144. See Pratt, supra note 3, at 216 (“[T]he majority of states . . . recognize a handbook 
exception.”). 
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that employer later attempts to unilaterally modify the promises 
therein. Most claim to resolve the question using traditional contract 
principles; even when applying the same terms and approaches, 
however, these courts often reach entirely opposite results.145 This 
unsatisfactory result in large part stems from the unfortunate 
blending of employment and contract law, which produces cases 
squeezing contract law into a shape it was not meant to fill. The most 
palatable approach that courts have adopted is that used in Asmus v. 
Pacific Bell, in which the court held that unilateral modification is 
permissible so long as reasonable notice is provided.146 Yet this rule is 
difficult to reconcile with traditional contract principles147 and no 
standard definition of reasonable notice has been developed.148 
Employment handbooks necessarily involve two competing 
interests: employers generally prefer that handbooks not give rise to 
binding obligations, whereas employees prefer that they do. The 
reasonable expectations in this relationship probably fall somewhere 
in between. At its simplest, this Note proposes adopting the Asmus 
rule—under which employers may unilaterally modify handbooks so 
long as they provide reasonable notice—and determining the length 
of time that is “reasonable” based upon the particular term at issue in 
the handbook. The length of time sufficient for notice to be 
reasonable should depend upon the nature of the manual provision: 
substantive changes, such as to compensation, require greater 
advance warning than those affecting procedures, such as internal 
company policies. This Note suggests that, ordinarily, the shortest 
time that could be reasonable is one workweek, and the maximum is 
one business quarter or three months. This rule would retain 
employer flexibility while limiting the harshness of the unilateral 
modification rule that otherwise would permit the employer to 
promise nearly anything to its employees only to revoke such 
 
 145. Walters, supra note 4, at 384–85. Compare Demasse v. ITT Corp., 984 P.2d 1138, 1145 
(Ariz. 1999) (finding an employer’s unilateral modification of a handbook provision invalid 
after applying uniltateral contracts analysis and noting “[c]ontinued employment after issuance 
of a new handbook does not constitute acceptance”), with Sadler v. Basin Elec. Power Coop. 
431 N.W.2d 296, 298 (N.D. 1988) (finding an employer’s unilateral modification of a handbook 
provision valid after applying unilateral contracts analysis and noting “[t]he employee’s 
retention of employment constitutes acceptance of the offer of a unilateral contract”). 
 146. Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 999 P.2d 71, 73 (Cal. 2000). 
 147. Apps, supra note 55, at 915 (“[T]he reasonable notice requirement cannot be a part and 
parcel of the fact that contracts are unilateral.”). 
 148. See discussion supra Part I. 
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promises on a whim in the future. Finally, handbook disclaimers 
should be irrelevant in handbook analysis, as they provide little to no 
added insight to the intentions of the parties but often permit gross 
unfairness on the part of employers toward employees. 
On a deeper level, however, this Note additionally proposes that 
courts should no longer cling to the safe harbor provided by contract 
principles; rather, they should embrace the concept of employment as 
status and consequently be willing to find the solution that is most 
equitable among the parties and not necessarily the “contractually” 
correct result. For so important and fundamental a relationship in the 
lives of people as the work relationship, it is of the utmost importance 
that courts seek to hold parties to basic notions of fairness. For 
handbooks, achieving fairness means delving into the fundamental 
nature of how they are used and impact the employment relationship; 
for employees and employers alike, handbooks typically mean greater 
stability, order, and efficiency in the workplace. But although 
employers should not be forever bound to antiquated policies 
disseminated through handbooks, employees should not be unjustly 
harmed by employers who can revoke any handbook promise on a 
whim. The solution for both is one of flexible, reasonable notice and 
ultimately greater fairness in employment. 
